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Abstract 
The result of Colombo and Labrecciosa (2006) that optimal punishments are 
inferior to Nash-reversion trigger strategies with decreasing marginal costs is 
due to the output when a firm deviates from the punishment path being 
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1. Introduction 
Recently, Colombo and Labrecciosa (2006) claimed to show that the optimal 
punishments of Abreu (1986) for sustaining collusion in a Cournot supergame were not 
optimal. They claimed that the optimal punishments were inferior to the Nash-reversion 
trigger strategies of Friedman (1971) when marginal cost decreased sufficiently with output. 
However, their analysis ignores their own assumption, A3, and the fact that the outputs of the 
firms must be non-negative. In particular, it turns out that the output when a firm deviates 
from the punishment path is actually negative for the parameter values where they obtain 
their result. This letter derives the optimal punishments and critical discount factor when the 
output of a firm that deviates from the punishment path is not allowed to be negative. Then, 
the critical discount factor with optimal punishments is compared to the critical discount 
factor with Nash-reversion trigger strategies, and it is shown that the critical discount factor 
with optimal punishments is always lower than the critical discount factor with Nash-
reversion trigger strategies. Therefore, optimal punishments of Abreu (1986) are not sub-
optimal with decreasing marginal cost. 
 
2. The Model 
The model and notation are the same as in Colombo and Labrecciosa (2006): two 
identical firms compete as Cournot duopolists in an infinitely repeated game with a common 
discount factor: ( )0,1δ ∈ . Demand for the homogeneous product is linear: 1 21p q q= − − , 
where iq  is the output of the ith firm with 1,2i = ; and total costs are: ( ) 2 2i i ic q q qα β= + , 
so marginal cost is linear in output: ( )i ic q qα β′ = + ; where ( )0,1α ∈  and ( )2,0β ∈ − , which 
implies decreasing marginal cost. As in Colombo and Labrecciosa (2006), assumption A3, 
outputs are assumed to be non-negative. 
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As in Colombo and Labrecciosa (2006), the output and profits of each firm when the 
firms collude and maximise industry profits are: 
 ( )( )
211
4 2 4C C
q
αα πβ β
−−= =+ +  (1) 
The output and profits when a firm deviates from collusion and maximises its profits 
given that its competitor produces Cq  are: 
 ( )( )( )( )
( ) ( )
( )( )
2 2
2
1 3 1 3
2 4 2 2 4D D
q
α β α βπβ β β β
− + − += =+ + + +  (2) 
Collusion can be sustained using the Nash-reversion trigger strategies of Friedman 
(1971) if the discount factor is sufficiently large. Firms collude by producing output Cq  
thereby earning profits Cπ  as long as no firm has deviated. If a firm deviates from producing 
output Cq  then both firms will produce the Cournot-Nash equilibrium output forever 
thereafter. As in Colombo and Labrecciosa (2006), the symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium 
output and profits of each firm are: 
 ( ) ( )( )
2
2
1 21
3 2 3N N
q
α βα πβ β
− +−= =+ +  (3) 
For ( )2, 1β ∈ − − , the Hahn stability condition is not satisfied and the symmetric Nash 
equilibrium is not unique as there are two other Nash equilibria where one firm produces its 
monopoly output and the other produces an output of zero. However, as in Colombo and 
Labrecciosa (2006), we will only consider reversion to the symmetric Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium. Therefore, the critical discount factor with Nash-reversion trigger strategies is: 
 ( )( )
2
*
2
3
2 3 1
D C
T
D N
βπ πδ π π β
+−= =− + −  (4) 
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This critical discount factor decreases from * 1Tδ =  when 2β = −  to * 9 17Tδ =  when 
0β = . 
Abreu (1986) characterised the optimal symmetric punishments for sustaining 
collusion in a symmetric Cournot supergame. Firms collude by each producing output Cq  
thereby earning profits Cπ  in the collusion path but if a firm deviates from the collusion path 
then all firms shift to the punishment path where each firm produces OPq  thereby earning 
profits of OPπ  for one period followed by a return to the collusive path. If a firm deviates 
from the punishment path then the punishment path will start again with the firms producing 
OPq  thereby earning profits of OPπ . The optimal punishments and critical discount factor can 
be derived by solving two simultaneous equations derived from the requirement that 
deviations from the collusive path and the punishment path are unprofitable for the firms. 
The flaw in the analysis of Colombo and Labrecciosa (2006) is that they claim that 
the profits of the firm when it deviates from the punishment phase are positive and decreasing 
in β  for 2 3 1 586β < − ≈ − ⋅ . As a result, they claim that optimal punishments are inferior 
to Nash-reversion trigger strategies for ( )1.8453, 1.7753β ∈ − − , but output when a firm 
deviates from the punishment path turns out to be negative for ( )2, 2 3β ∈ − − . The output 
and profits of the firm when it deviates on the punishment path in their analysis can be 
obtained by substituting their equation (12) into their equation (11), which yields: 
 
( )( )
( )( )( )
( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )
222 2
* *
2 2
1 7 6 1 7 6
2 2 3 4 2 2 3 4DOP DOP
q
α β β α β βπβ β β β β β
− + + − + += =+ + + + + +  (5) 
Since ( )2,0β ∈ −  and ( )0,1α ∈  all the terms are positive except 27 6β β+ + , which 
is negative for 2 3β < − , therefore, although profits are positive, the output of the firm that 
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deviates from the punishment path is negative for 2 3β < − . Obviously, the output of the 
firm when it deviates from the punishment path cannot be negative, so there will obviously be 
a corner solution where the firm produces zero output, 0DOPq = , and makes zero profits, 
0DOPπ =  for ( )2, 2 3β ∈ − − . The firm will be forced down to its security level of zero in 
the punishment path. From Abreu (1986), the condition for sustaining cooperation in the 
punishment path is that deviation is not profitable: 
 ( )DOP OP C OPπ π δ π π− ≤ −  (6) 
When ( )2, 2 3β ∈ − − , the profits from deviating in the punishment path are zero, 
0DOPπ = , and the profits with the optimal punishment are obtained by solving (6) when it 
holds with equality: 
 ( )( )( )
2
2
1
1 2 1 4OP C
δ αδπ πδ δ β
−−= =− − +  (7) 
From Abreu (1986), the condition for sustaining collusion is that deviation from the 
collusive path is not profitable: 
 ( )D C C OPπ π δ π π− ≤ −  (8) 
Substituting (7) into (8) and solving when it holds with equality yields the critical 
discount factor with optimal punishments: 
 ( ) ( )* 21 2, 2 33OPδ ββ= ∀ ∈ − −+  (9) 
This critical discount factor decreases from * 1OPδ =  when 2β = −  to * 12OPδ =  when 
2 3β = − . Substituting the critical discount factor with optimal punishments into (7) yields 
the profits in the punishment path: 
 5
 ( )( )( )
2
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2 2 4OP
απ β β
−= − <+ +  (10) 
Profits in the punishment path are negative so one should check that the 
corresponding price will be positive in the punishment path. The corresponding output of 
each firm and price in the punishment path can easily be obtained, but the expressions are 
very messy. However, it can be shown that the price in the punishment path is positive 
provided α  exceeds a critical value, *α α> , which is less than one but which tends to one as 
2β → − . 
To compare the sustainability of collusion, subtract the critical discount factor with 
optimal punishments (9) from the critical discount factor with Nash-reversion trigger 
strategies (4), which yields: 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )
2 2
* *
2 2
2 4
0
3 2 3 1
T OP
β βδ δ β β
+ +− = >⎡ ⎤+ + −⎣ ⎦
 (11) 
Since ( )22 3 1 0β+ − >  for ( )2,0β ∈ − , the difference in the critical discount factors 
is positive so the optimal punishments of Abreu (1986) are superior to the Nash-reversion 
trigger strategies of Friedman (1971). This is shown in figure one and leads to the following 
proposition: 
Proposition: For ( )2, 2 3β ∈ − − , the critical discount factor for Nash-reversion 
trigger strategies is larger than the critical discount factor for optimal punishments. 
This contradicts the result of Colombo and Labrecciosa (2006) who claimed that 
optimal punishments were not optimal but they ignored the non-negativity constraint for 
output when a firm deviates in the punishment path. 
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3. Conclusion 
This note has shown that the result in Colombo and Labrecciosa (2006) that the 
optimal punishments of Abreu (1986) are inferior to Nash-reversion trigger strategies of 
Friedman (1971) with rapidly decreasing marginal costs was due to the output when a firm 
deviates from the punishment path being allowed to become negative. When outputs are 
required to be non-negative, the superiority of the optimal punishments over Nash-reversion 
trigger strategies is restored. There seems no reason to believe that the optimal punishments 
of Abreu (1986 and 1988) do not apply to the case of decreasing marginal costs. 
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